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Note on Friedman’s ‘what 
informatics is and isn’t’ 
Friedman’s article ‘What informatics is 
and isn’t’, presents a necessary and 
timely analysis of the field of informatics. 
After defining some of its characteristics, 
training needs and also examples of what 
it isn’t, the author re-introduces what he 
has called ‘the fundamental theorem of 
informatics’ —originally formulated for 
biomedical informatics—‘that persons 
supported by information technology will 
be better than the same persons perform-
ing the same task unassisted’. Figure 1 
shows it graphically. 
Both the theorem and the picture have 
become well known in the biomedical 
informatics field. However, while an inter-
esting, thought-provoking exercise, this 
proposal about ‘what informatics is and 
isn’t’ faces several scientific vulnerabilities, 
as noted below. 
THE TERM ‘INFORMATICS’ 
The term ‘informatics’ derives from the 
German ‘Informatik’, the Russian 
‘Informatika’ and the French ‘informatique’, 
which combines ‘information’ with ‘auto-
matique’. One concept lies at its core: infor-
mation. While it is clear how ‘informatics’ is 
semantically linked to ‘information’, what is 
meant by information is not so obvious: it 
can convey a wide range of meanings: 
• The concept of information as ori-
ginally proposed by Szilard to 
provide an answer to the famous 
‘Maxwell’s demon’ thought experi-
ment in physics. 
• The engineering or communication 
and coding theory sense that 
Shannon used to defined the term, 
in which ‘information’ is associated 
with the concept of entropy—also 
from physics. 
• Other meanings of scientific informa-
tion, such as, for instance, the infor-
mation that is associated with 
molecules, for example, binding, with 
particles and sub-particles—quantum 
information—or with other biological 
entities such as cells, tissues, organs, 
etc. This can refer to how DNA codes 
biological information, which is basic-
ally known, or how this information is 
translated and transmitted to higher 
levels of biological aggregation and 
function through living cells such as 
human neurons, which is as yet 
unknown. As Shannon himself rea-
lized and stated, his (syntactical) 
theory was not relevant to capture the 
characteristics of biological 
information. 
• Broad societal and colloquial uses of 
the concept information, such as 
referring to the news, signals, 
stimuli, data plus meaning, etc, seen 
from different social, economic, his-
torical, or political or technological 
perspectives, defined, usually, quite 
vaguely. 
Without a standard meaning of infor-
mation, it is difficult—or impossible—to 
establish a definition of informatics that 
can cover the scope of its uses from such 
an informational perspective. 
VULNERABILITIES OF THE 
‘FUNDAMENTAL THEOREM OF 
INFORMATICS’ 
The fundamental theorem faces a number 
of vulnerabilities: 
• It is not really about a fundamental 
scientific issue, nor does it provide a 
formal foundation for scientific 
inquiry. This contrasts with examples 
such as Shannon’s information 
theory—including its theorems— 
which, using entropy to quantify 
channel capacity, provided the 
formal foundations for signal coding 
and communication. 
• It is not a theorem, as in mathematics 
or logic, which Merriam-Webster 
online defines as: ‘(a) a formula, prop-
osition, or statement in mathematics 
or logic deduced or to be deduced 
from other formulas or propositions, 
(b) an idea accepted or proposed as a 
demonstrable truth, often as a part of 
a general theory’ Friedman’s is a chal-
lenging, intuitive hypothesis, but not 
really a theorem, as it can be neither 
deduced nor demonstrated -nor 
falsified. 
• It is not about informatics itself. If it 
were, it would address and explain 
an intrinsic concept related to 
informatics, such as logic, process-
ing, communication, storage, etc, 
which could help develop new the-
ories, methods or products specific 
to informatics, but is here instead 
focused on the operational use of 
informatics by people. 
• The proposed ‘fundamental theorem’ 
implies some kind of Turing-like test, 
including conditions for its applicabil-
ity, and experimentally measurable 
outcomes to demonstrate its validity. It 
can be considered too general, and 
subject to refutation in practice. 
• Computer interaction is hardly as 
unambiguous as the ‘fundamental 
theorem’ suggests. Harvard’s Shoshana 
Zuboff, presciently described how 
computers introduced by organizations 
lacking good information models, and 
socially well-adapted management 
structures (often by persons lacking 
adequate skills or understanding of 
information processes) can hurt, rather 
than improve work process efficiency 
and effectiveness. 
• Computers relying on imprecise or 
inappropriate models of economic, 
technological and sociological condi-
tions frequently detract from intelli-
gent human performance. For 
creative artistic endeavors, such as 
writing, the value added by compu-
ters can be questionable, as per 
Nobelist Vargas Llosa: ‘the more 
intelligent our computer is, the 
dumber we will be’. 
THE ‘FUNDAMENTAL THEOREM’ 
PICTURE 
Figure 1, obviously metaphorical in 
‘adding together’ very different entities 
like a human brain and a computer, brings 
to mind the strictures from John Von 
Neumann himself, on the fundamental 
Figure 1 Friedman’s ‘fundamental theorem of informatics’.1 
differences between artificial computers 
and brains in terms of logic, memory, 
storage, architecture, use of energy, pro-
cessing, information coding and manage-
ment, fault-tolerance, number of 
components, size, speed, access time, 
organization, etc. Subsequent scientific 
research and experience supports these 
reservations, despite the hopes expressed 
for artificial intelligence by Simon and 
Newell in their 1975 Turing Award 
description of physical symbol systems 
and their hypothesis about them in 
human and machine symbolic reasoning. 
The reliance on a similar kind of hypoth-
esis and much more is implicit in the 
imagery and statement of Friedman’s fun-
damental theorem, which is certainly chal-
lenging, but remains too generic to be 
evaluated—or falsified. More importantly, 
it does not address a key objective of a sci-
entific discipline: to propose central 
hypotheses and theories that become 
exemplars in guiding and articulating 
current and future research. Without new 
theories of information, at multiple bio-
logical and social levels, informatics can 
be defined only from an operational per-
spective. Friedman’s proposal can be seen 
as a relevant reminder about the need to 
define biomedical informatics scientific-
ally. However, a ‘fundamental theorem’ of 
informatics—if such a theorem were pos-
sible— is still pending, as also ‘what 
informatics is and isn’t’ from an informa-
tional perspective, especially for biomed-
ical informatics, given its biological and 
evolutionary scientific foundations. 
Victor Maojo,1 Casimir A Kulikowski2 
1
 Biomedical Informatics Group, Universidad Politecnica 
de Madrid, Madrid, Spain 
2Department of Computer Science, Rutgers, 
The State University of New Jersey, Piscataway, New 
Jersey, USA 
REFERENCES 
1 Friedman CP. What informatics is and isn’t. J Am Med 
Inform Assoc 2013;20:224–6. 
2 Heims S; The Cybernetics Group. The MIT Press. 1991. 
3 Shoshana Z. In the age of the smart machine: the 
future of work and power. New York: Basic, 1988. 
4 Vargas Llosa M. Más información, menos 
conocimiento. http://elpais.com/diario/2011/07/31/ 
opinion/1312063211_850215.html (accessed 15 Mar 
2013). 
5 von Neumann J. The computer and the brain. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1958. 
